A retrospective epidemiologic study was conducted to evaluate the application of an objective quantitative algorithm for estimating genetic similarity from restriction endonuclease analysis data. The analysis was performed to assist the determination of chronologic trends in an Aujeszky's disease viral epidemic in a geographic region. DNA from each viral isolate obtained during the epidemic was digested with 4 restriction endonucleases and molar ratio labeled to generate separate fragment patterns that were simultaneously compared using the algorithm. The resultant estimates of genetic similarity were then used in conjunction with time of virus isolation and specific geographic location of the outbreaks to identify the probable sources of infection and the patterns of spread among swine herds. This type of quantitative analysis enabled a more precise and objective approach than previously has been applied to the interpretation of restriction endonuclease data, thereby demonstrating the benefit of this methodology for the investigation of infectious disease outbreaks.
Restriction endonuclease analysis (REA) has been used as an epidemiologic tool to support hypotheses regarding the source of Aujeszky's disease (AD, pseudorabies) virus (ADV) infection for swine farms and individual animals. 7, 8, 24, 26, 38 Restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) among viral isolates has been used to distinguish field and vaccine strains of ADV. 11, 12, 19, 29 To utilize REA for epidemiologic purposes, it was necessary to establish that ADV is relatively stable genetically, both in vivo and in vitro. In previous study, there was enough viral genomic stability in a swine herd to enable the use of REA to categorize isolates into strains. 10 This type of first-order molecular characterization of DNA polymorphism has been based on visual comparisons and/or the use of 1-dimensional computerized dendrograms to produce phylogenetic trees representing the percentage of similarity or diversity.
Considerations of an ADV epidemic within a geographic location must include animal sources other than swine, although such nonporcine species usually are dead-end hosts. Domestic livestock (cattle, goats, sheep) 3, 5, 13, 14, 25, 30, 35 and wildlife (wild rats, mice, mink, fox, deer, badger, coyotes, hare, raccoons) 21, 28, 37 are susceptible to natural ADV infections. Deaths from ADV infections also may occur in cats and dogs residing on or near premises with infected livestock. 4, 6, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23, 31 Moreoever, ADV was genetically stable during in vivo passage through nonporcine species. 33 Epidemiologic applications of REA include documenting the occurrence of new ADV strains in an area and classifying isolates from a geographic location into groups to infer viral transmission. In this regard, REA was performed on ADV isolated from moribund lambs. 38 The infected lambs had both fence line contact with swine and exposure to a syringe, which had previously been used to vaccinate swine with a modified live ADV product. The resultant patterns indicated that the lambs were infected with the vaccine strain of the virus. Similar analyses of ADV isolates in Denmark established that a new strain of the virus, type II, was involved with swine outbreaks in the winters of 1984-1987. 8, 9 In another study, investigators identified up to 11 groups of ADV isolates from Illinois and Missouri that were indistinguishable, indicating possible epidemiologic relationships. 33 However, studies have not been performed in the USA to explore the epidemiologic application of REA in evaluating the chronologic trends of ADV infections in a particular geographic region.
In this retrospective study, quantatitive methods were used to compare viral isolates obtained from an ADV epidemic in a geographic region. The RFLP patterns generated using 4 restriction endonucleases were simultaneously compared using an objective quantitative algorithm. 39 The estimates of genetic similarity were used in conjunction with time and specific geographic location of the outbreaks to formulate hypotheses regarding the probable sources of infection and the patterns of transmission of the virus among swine herds. The overall aim of this study was to develop this type of quantitative analysis to enable a more powerful approach than previously has been applied in the interpretation of REA data and to demonstrate the utility of these methods in the investigation of infectious disease outbreaks.
Case histories of AD area outbreaks
The farms (n ϭ 14) that experienced AD outbreaks over a 10-month period and from which virus was isolated from a total of 16 animals (swine or other domestic or wild mammals) were clustered in 5 geographic areas. Figure 1 shows the location of the farms in the outbreak investigation and of all other swine herds quarantined for ADV infection in this region during this time period.
Area A. Three outbreaks occurred in area A between January and July. Farm A1 was an unvaccinated swine herd and was managed as a confinement and partial confinement operation. In February, the owner removed dirt from a drainage ditch and placed it in the farrowing crates for an iron supplement. Within 4 days, a mortality rate of 70-80% occurred in the newborn pigs exposed to the dirt. ADV was isolated from 3 of the affected newborns. Several raccoons were seen on the farmstead, especially in the hay storage barn. In addition, the owner had reported finding dying raccoons on his property since fall; the cause of death was not investigated.
Around January, over 200 feeder pigs were purchased by the owner of farm A2. The pigs were vaccinated against ADV using a modified live product. a The owner housed feeder swine and sheep in the same building. About 10% of these pigs died of an undiagnosed respiratory disease. The following March, several lambs began to die with clinical signs including respiratory disease and paresis. ADV was later isolated from an affected individual within the flock. At this same time, 1 dog on the farm died after presenting with the clinical signs of lethargy and pruritis, consistent with an ADV infection. The sheep were then vaccinated for ADV with a different modified live product b (off-label use); all subsequently died of apparent vaccine-induced disease. In addition, young pigs in a 300-sow farrow-to-finish operation on the premises manifested disease signs characteristic of AD. As a result, the swine herd was quarantined in June.
Farm A3 also experienced sheep mortality, in this case starting in January. The sheep were allowed to graze outside of an ADV-infected pig finishing unit to help control weeds. In the previous fall, the swine herd had numerous stillbirths and mummified fetuses; however, AD was not diagnosed at that time. In July, the herd began experiencing a disease outbreak that involved the central nervous system (CNS). At this time, sheep began to die quickly and ADV was isolated from ovine tissue, which resulted in the quarantine of the swine herd that month.
Area B. Four separate outbreaks of AD occurred in pigs between March and April. Farm B1 contained an unvaccinated herd that was encountering stillbirths and weak, fading newborns. ADV was isolated from affected pigs in March.
Farm B2 was a 300-sow farrow-to-finish pasture operation that had been quarantined for the previous 6 years. The swine were vaccinated against ADV with a modified live product a at weaning and prior to breeding. In April, CNS disease and pyrexia developed in pigs 3-5 weeks of age and resulted in a total death loss of 30 pigs. ADV was isolated from 1 of these pigs.
Farm B3 consisted of a 50-sow farrow-to-finish pasture operation. In March, a clinical disease outbreak occurred that included scouring, convulsions, and mummified fetuses. Forty of 1,000 pigs from gilt litters died. In April, ADV was isolated from dead newborn pigs.
Farm B4 contained a 160-sow feeder pig operation with both confinement facilities and outside hog lots. On the basis of area testing, the herd was placed on quarantine for 14 months prior to this episode. In April, clinical disease developed in the herd, consisting of a 50% stillbirth rate, sudden death in 3-week-old pigs, and diarrhea with poor conditioning in 5-weekold nursery pigs. In addition, 5% of the pigs 3 months of age died after presenting with diarrhea. At this time, ADV was isolated from dead pigs 3-5 weeks of age.
Area C. The three separate outbreaks of AD that occurred in this area between January and October involved several different species. Three other farms in this area became serologically positive for AD at this time, but virus was not isolated. Farm C1 contained a 45-sow farrow-to-finish herd with partial confinement facilities. Animals had not been vaccinated against ADV. In January, the herd was placed on quarantine after experiencing CNS disease among the weanling animals. During this outbreak, ADV was isolated from dead pigs.
Farm C2 consisted of 2 adjacent sites owned and operated by 1 family. One site was a 120-sow farrowto-finish partial confinement herd. In January, a dead and partially consumed raccoon was found in the yard of the other site, which did not have the swine herd. The dog living on this site subsequently became aggressive and pruritic, began to vomit, and eventually died. Virus was isolated in January from both the raccoon and the dog. Prior to this, the adjoining swine herd had been under quarantined for 8 years but was released from quarantine the previous October after a vaccination and testing program. After finding the infected raccoon and dog, the swine herd was retested and found negative for ADV infection.
Farm C3 contained a herd of approximately 200 sows, which had been placed on quarantine in February as a result of testing to confirm a suspected ADV infection. A sheep flock also was located on the premises. A vaccination program using 2 modified live products was introduced, consisting of 1 vaccine a administered to the growing pigs and the other vaccine b administered to the breeding stock. An outbreak of disease occurred in January and involved abortions, respiratory signs in the finishing hogs, and CNS signs in the young pigs. A sheep flock coinhabiting a lot with culled breeding swine experienced mortality in early January after their exposure to sows that had aborted. A dog and a cat on the farm also died during this outbreak. The following October, after culled sows had been placed in the same pasture as the sheep, ADV was isolated from ovine tissues. This later episode was considered a recurrence of the existing infection in the swine herd.
Area D. Two swine operations and 1 cattle herd were involved in an AD outbreak between January and April. Farm D1 was 1 of the swine herds, a 35-sow farrow-to-finish with partial confinement. In January, a dog died after manifesting signs of dementia and pruritis. At this time, postmortem virus isolation efforts yielded ADV from the canine tissues and from aborted pigs.
Farm D2 was the only nonswine facility in this study and had only a few finishing cattle on the premises. As with farm D1, ADV was also isolated in January, this time from the tissues of 1 of the 2 cattle that died following CNS disease signs.
Farm D3 was a farrow-to-finish and feeder pig operation. The facilities consisted of pasture and some concrete lots. The 20-sow herd was not vaccinated. The disease outbreak occurred in April and was characterized by CNS signs and sudden deaths in young pigs. ADV was isolated from the diseased animals.
Area E. The AD problem in this area involved 2 working dogs on the farm. In October, the swine herd developed clinical signs of AD, and at the owner's request the dogs were given a modified live ADV vaccine a (off-label use). Both dogs subsequently died shortly after vaccination from classical AD; virus was isolated from 1 of the dogs.
Materials and methods
Geographic analysis. Information on herd locations was obtained from on-site epidemiologic investigations of each of the 15 separate clincal outbreaks of AD. A computerized geographic information system c was used to plot farm locations.
ADV isolates. Virus was obtained by direct isolation using tissues from multiple species (including swine, sheep, cattle, dogs, raccoons) experiencing naturally occurring AD. In all cases, genomic DNA was phenol : chloroform extracted from each viral isolate (n ϭ 16) for subsequent REA. In addition, 2 known ADV vaccine strains a,b were processed in a similar manner for REA comparison purposes because these products were implicated in the deaths of several animals other than pigs.
Restriction endonuclease and molar ratio labeling. Genomic DNA from each viral isolate was separately digested with Alw44I, BamHI, SalI, and XhoI according to manufacturer's d recommendations. The restriction enzymes were selected based on their ability to digest the viral DNA into Ͼ10 fragments with 5Ј termini containing only 1 G residue. The resultant fragments from each digest were molar ratio end-labeled as previously described. 36 Two micrograms of digested DNA was added to the labeling mix (1 mM dithiothreltol, 10 mM MgCl 2 , 20 M dATP, e dGTP, e and d-TTP e , 3 U Klenow fragment d , 20 Ci [␣- 32 P]dCTP f ) in a final volume of 35 l and incubated at 25 C for 30 min. After incubation, the fragments were electrophoresed in a 15-ϫ 25-cm 0.8% agarose g gel for 18 hr at 50 V. Base-pair (bp) size markers consisted of lambda DNA, h which had been digested with EcoR1 and HindIII and then end-labeled as above using [␣-32 P]dATP. f Following electrophoresis, the gels were rinsed in distilled H 2 O for 10 min at 25 C prior to drying with a slab gel drier. i The dried gels were used to produce autoradiographs j at Ϫ70 C.
Fragments were visualized on the developed autoradiographs using a scanning densitometer, k and their migration distances were determined using an applicable software program. k Potential variations between and within gels were addressed by using the ratio of the relative migration distances of each fragment as compared to in-the-gel base-pair size markers (positioned in both outside lanes) to generate data points for computerized quantitative analysis. Because of inadequate resolution inherent with small fragments electrophoresied in large agarose gels, the limited number of fragments smaller than 947 bp were not included in the analysis.
Quantitative methods. The genetic similarity or distance between each pair of viral isolates was based on a formula that compares the distribution of different sizes of restriction endonuclease fragments: 39
where i ϭ base-pair size of fragment i of sample A, j ϭ base-pair size of fragment j of sample B, n ϭ number of fragments in sample A, m ϭ number of fragments in sample B, and r ϭ power to which differences in fragment base-pair sizes are raised. The square root variant of distance metric (r ϭ 1/2) was used because in previous studies it provided the most interpretable results. This formula was modified to give a distance of zero for identical fragment patterns and for use with multiple enzymes, as previously described. 39 A hierarchical cluster analysis was used to identify the ADV isolates that were genetically similar to each other. 1, 17 The complete linkage algorithm produced clusters with elements that were all closely related to one another, which was considered desirable in reconstructing the possible course of the epidemic.
Reconstruction of the course of the epidemic. Genomic similarities among the 16 ADV isolates and the 2 vaccine strains were used in conjunction with the geographic location and the date of virus isolation to identify farms that were most likely to have a common origin in the spread of ADV. Farms that shared a common branch in the cluster analysis solution were ''joined.'' These joins were examined to create inferred ''links'' between farms, in terms of spread of ADV. The following decision rules were applied to the linking of the farms to identify potential patterns of spread of ADV over the course of the epidemic. First, the farms with the closest distance in the cluster analysis were linked as farms sharing a common source of ADV. Second, the dendrogram from the cluster analysis was inspected, and links were made between farms in increasing order of distance in the genetic clusters. When a farm was joined with an existing cluster, the link of inferred spread of ADV was made to the farm in the cluster with the closest genetic distance unless there was corroborating evidence (time of isolation, geographic distance, likely mechanism of transmission) that another farm with similar genetic distance was a more likely candidate for transmission. Third, the source for spread was the farm with the earliest date of virus isolation, provided there was at least 14 days difference in the time of virus isolation. In cases with less than 14 days differences, the direction of transmission was considered to be uncertain. This uncertainty could be resolved by direct evidence (e.g., travel patterns, evidence of consumption) indicating direction of association. Fourth, in identifying possible mechanisms of ADV spread, the possible role of free-living mammalian species (wildlife, dogs) with clinical signs of AD was considered. Fifth, remaining uncertainties regarding direction of transmission were resolved by examining the temporal patterns of virus isolation and the geographic distribution of the farms. Transmission was inferred to have occurred from an area of higher density of ADV infection to an area of lower density, provided the outbreak was apparent earlier in the higher density area.
Results
The geographic locations of the farms comprising the AD outbreak investigations from which virus was isolated and all other swine herds quarantined for ADV infection in this region during the time of the outbreak are shown in Fig. 1 . The distance between the farms investigated ranged from a minimum of 1.8 km (1.1 miles) (between farms C2 and C3) to a maximum of 43.9 km (27.2 miles) (between farms C1 and D3).
The genetic distances between viral isolates, as calculated using the square root distance algorithm, are presented in Table 1 . A dendrogram, produced by the cluster analysis of the genetic distances, identified 4 genetic clusters (Fig. 2) . The largest cluster (1) consists of 10 ADV isolates from 8 farms, with most of the disease outbreaks occurring during the early months (January and February) of the epidemic. Viral isolates from 4 of the 5 geographic regions (all except region E) are represented in this genetic cluster. The second largest cluster contains 4 ADV isolates from farms in 2 adjacent areas. Chronologically, the first 3 of these viruses were obtained from farms in region B during the 4th month of the epidemic. The remaining isolate in this grouping was obtained from a farm in area A during 7th month of the outbreak. Cluster 3 is comprised of 2 ADV samples, 1 of which (D2) was isolated from cattle and was most closely linked with a vaccine virus, a suggesting that the animal may have been infected with this virus. Although the farm did not raise pigs, there were several swine farms in the area that used this product. Cluster 4 also consisted of 2 samples, a vaccine virus b and a virus (E1) isolated The transmission linkages among the farms and the inferred directions of spread, as determined from the genetic distances (Table 1 ) of the ADV isolates and corroborating evidence, are depicted in Fig. 1 . The closest genetic relationship exists between virus samples D1a (isolated 1/19) and C2a (isolated 1/24), both from dogs (Fig. 2) . Although contact between the dogs with a shared source of virus may be possible (considering the chronologic closeness of virus isolation), this presumed transmission would have occurred between animals whose home farms were 40.2 km (24.9 miles) apart, thereby making this linkage remote.
The second closest genetic associations were in the subcluster of isolates A1, A2, and D1b. The D1b virus had the earliest date of isolation (1/31) and therefore was considered the source for transmission (Fig. 1) . The second ADV isolate was from farm A1 (2/14), inferring that ADV may have spread from farm D1 to A1 (13.1 km [8.1 miles]). The closest genetic relative of A2 was D1b, and the next closest was A1. Although A2 (isolated 3/17) was nearer to A1 geographically (6.1 km [3.8 miles]) and chronologically (2/14) than to D1b (12.6 km [7.8 miles], isolated 1/31), it was genetically more similar to D1b than to A1 (Table 1) . Thus, the spread of ADV to farm A2 appeared more likely to have occurred from farm D1.
Isolate D3, obtained at a later date (4/5) from swine, was the next closest to the joined subclusters (C2a-D1a and A1-A2-D1b) and had its most similar genetic relationship to canine isolates C2a and D1a (Table 1) . Although isolate D3 was genetically most similar to C2a, these farms were 42.4 km (26.3 miles) apart and, therefore, D3 was linked instead to canine isolate D1a, its next closest relationship, as the virus source originating on farm D1, only 5.6 km (3.5 miles) away (Fig.  1 ). However, there is substantial genetic evidence joining the canine isolate, C2a, closely to several isolates in geographic regions A and D, with more distant relationships in the cluster dendrogram with isolates in its same geographic region, C. Because the isolates from regions A and D in this growing subgroup were obtained later than isolate C2a, it appears that C2a was a more likely source of the ADV infection for the dog on D1 than vice versa. Therefore, a linkage has been made in Fig. 1 to represent this inferred direction of transmission.
Porcine isolate B1 in cluster 1 was genetically most similar to bovine isolate A2 ( Table 1) . Consideration of the dates of virus isolation (3/14 and 3/17) resulted in uncertainty regarding the direction of spread. However, B1 was isolated later than D1a and A1, samples with which it shared a recent common origin. It appears more likely that the epidemic spread outward from a single point source rather than inward from separate sources. Therefore, A2 was inferred to be the source of ADV transmission to B1 rather than the converse ( Fig. 1) .
Ovine isolate C3 is loosely joined to the remainder of cluster 1, being most genetically similar to B1 and C1 (Table 1) . Because farms C1 and C3 are close both geographically and chronologically, a link was made between these farms (Fig. 1) . However, because of the closeness in the dates of virus isolation (C3: 1/12, C1: 1/17) and the lack of ancillary information, an inference cannot be made regarding the direction of transmission.
Cluster 2 contains isolates obtained only from livestock. The closest genetic relationship in this cluster was found between porcine isolates B2 and B3, which were obtained on the same day (4/26). The genetic similarity and geographic (4.2 km [2.6 miles]) and temporal proximities suggested transmission occurred between the farms, yet the direction is uncertain (Fig.  1 ). Furthermore, without direct evidence of transmission from free-living animals, the mode of transmission also was uncertain.
The other subgrouping in cluster 2 contains isolates A3 and B4. Ovine isolate A3 was most closely associated with isolate B2, also in cluster 2. However in contrast to cluster 1, where all the isolates had their closest genetic relatives in cluster 1, the loosely joined farms B4 and A3 in cluster 2 actually had closer genetic relatives in cluster 1 ( Table 1) . Isolate B4 was slightly more genetically similar to isolates D3 (3.58) and A2 (3.63) than it was to B2 (3.79). Likewise, A3 had its closest genetic similarity to canine isolate D1a (4.04). However, these genetic distances were large compared with those among the more closely joined isolates in cluster 1 (genetic distances Ͻ 3.0). Although ADV was isolated from farm B4 (4/20) about 2 weeks later than was D3 (4/5), its closest genetic relative, both viruses were obtained from livestock, and the farms were separated by 24.5 km (15.2 miles). Sample A3 (isolated 7/5) was separated in both time and distance (14.2 km [8.8 miles]) from the farm from which its closest genetic relative (D1a) was isolated. Therefore, the sources of infection for farms B4 and A3 remain unclear (Fig. 1) .
Bovine isolate D2 is most closely joined to a vaccine virus a (cluster 3). The farm did not contain swine nor was there any known exposure of this animal to the vaccine; however, the product was used widely to vaccinate swine in this region.
The AD outbreak that took place in area E involved a dog, which had been vaccinated with a live modified ADV vaccine. b As expected, virus E1 was most genetically similar to the vaccine virus (cluster 4). This result provided an external validation of the genetic classification algorithm.
Discussion
Precise diagnostic tools are often needed in epidemiologic investigations to determine accurately the sources of infection. Estimates of genetic similarity between isolates of pathogenic organisms are important for understanding the patterns of spread, with the assumption that genetic similarity is usually associated with proximity in the links of transmission. There is a greater need for precision in estimating genetic similarity in local outbreaks where isolates of a pathogen may be closely related genetically. In this study, an objective quantitative algorithm for estimating viral genomic similarities was evaluated for its epidemiologic application. The RFLP patterns for ADV isolated from field outbreaks were used in the analysis. One would expect that the genetic distances to have a positive correlation with temporal and spatial relationships and that any changes in the viral genome detectable by REA would accumulate over time and distance. Therefore, with the methodology used in this study, it was possible to evaluate the information on genetic similarity in conjunction with information on the time of virus isolation, geographic location, and species involved to generate a hypothetical scenario for ADV transmission among 6 of the 14 farms during the course of the epidemic.
To develop the hypothetical model of ADV spread, formal decision rules for interpreting different sources of information from epidemiologic investigations were proposed. The closest genetic links were assumed to be sources and destinations for spread of ADV, with the earlier isolate assumed to be the source. In cases of multiple possible source-to-destination links, closer geographic proximity was considered to indicate the more probable course of transmission. Where viral iso-lates from free-living mammals (e.g., dogs and raccoons) were linked to other samples as close genetic relatives, it was inferred that the free-living mammals played a role in ADV transmission because they were capable of moving between farms on a regular basis. However, in any epidemiologic investigation there is likely to be incomplete information on patterns of spread; it is not always possible to isolate the pathogenic organism from all individuals on all farms involved or from infected animals on neighboring farms that may be undetected at the time. As a consequence, proposed hypothetical pathways of spread using these techniques are more accurate in designating transmission links between geographic areas than between specific farms. Moreover, in some cases, where accurate ancillary information on a transmission event is available (e.g., observation of a dog consuming a raccoon, knowledge of administration of a vaccine to a specific animal), confirmatory evidence of genetic similarity tightens the hypothetical transmission link.
As examples of this evaluation process, the linkages inferred from viral isolates obtained from free-living animals (e.g., dogs, raccoons) suggest a role these animals may have played in the transmission of ADV. The isolates in the A1-A2-D1b subgroup were from livestock (D1b and A1 from swine; A2 from sheep), which are unlikely vectors for transmission of ADV between farms, unless the swine farms marketed hogs on the same day(s) using a common truck. 2 Airborne transmission is a possibility. 8, 34 However, the closest genetic relationship between the C2a-D1a (both dogs) and D1b-A1-A2 (swine and sheep) subclusters was between the isolates from farm D1, implicating transmission between the dog and swine on that farm. A similar pattern of canine transmission may have been involved in the spread of ADV from D1 to A1 and A2. Isolate A1 had its nearest genetic association with the canine isolate C2a, although this is not revealed by the cluster analysis. Similarly, isolate A2, which clustered with D1b, also was genetically linked to A1 and to canine isolates C2a and D1a. Furthermore, the closer genetic relationship of D3 (swine) to C2a than to D1a suggests that the dog from farm C2 may have wandered in region D and possibly region A. The next closest genetic association in cluster 1 was between isolates C1 and C2b. C1 was isolated from swine early in the epidemic (1/17). Isolate C2b was isolated later (2/2) from a partially consumed raccoon found on the farm. The evidence available suggests that the freeliving raccoon may have acquired ADV on farm C1 and then traveled to farm C2. However, a link to transmission from raccoons to dogs is also implicated. Isolate C1 had its next closest genetic similarity to C2a. The small genetic distance between the raccoon isolate, D3, and the canine isolates, C2a and D1a, sup-ports evidence of probable transmission of ADV between these animals.
Ancillary information is important in determining patterns of spread, particularly when there are multiple samples of close genetic similarity isolated during a short time interval. Some anomalies in the present analysis might have been reconciled with additional ancillary information. For example, the closest genetic relationship among all the isolates was between viruses obtained from 2 dogs whose residences were located 40 km (25 miles) apart. This distance is probably greater than the normal range of travel for farm dogs. It was not known whether these dogs had contact through some other means, e.g., one of the farmers visiting the other and bringing the dog along. In this case, obtaining swine with ADV infection was ruled out as a common source of infection because the swine on 1 of the farms lacked antibodies to ADV. However, in general, these possibilities for common sources of infection need to be investigated. The advantage of the techniques used in this study is that the genetic similarities were precisely established, thereby implicating transmission links. It is then the responsibility of epidemiologists to investigate possible modes of transmission to determine if the link is feasible and, if so, the source and the destination of infection.
Complete genomic REA is a relatively inexpensive tool for identifying genetic similarities. Simple comparative methods, such as identifying the presence or absence of specific restriction fragments, may be useful in some cases. However, there is a possibility of some error in estimating the sizes of the fragments, which form the basis of estimating genetic similarity. A previous study on the replicability of results found that there was high agreement in the estimation of fragment sizes. 39 Complete genomic comparison, using percentage of fragment matching as an estimate of genetic relatedness, improves the precision in estimating relatedness. 18, 27, 32 However, specifying a matching criterion (i.e., how similar in size must fragments be to be considered a match) involves somewhat subjective criteria. In addition, using the percentage of fragment matches as a measure of similarity also does not utilize the full amount of information available on distributions of fragment sizes, as does the quantitative algorithm employed here. 39 Moreover, the use of this quantitative algorithm for data generated with multiple restriction enzymes improves the precision in the estimation of genetic relatedness.
Despite the promise of increased precision in estimating genetic relatedness using the methods reported here, in practical situations caution must be exercised. The estimation of genetic distance is dependent upon the restriction enzymes used. Employing several restriction endonucleases that have different cutting sites would help increase the ability to distinguish differences and identify similarities among viruses isolated during a disease outbreak. Furthermore, when interpreting the results of the cluster analysis, there is some statistical uncertainty in that the dendrogram does not replicate the exact genetic distances among the isolates. The dendrogram is the best possible representation of relatedness under the selected algorithm. Although the complete linkage algorithm will form clusters of samples that are all closely related, this analysis demonstrated that there are times when closely related samples are not classified into the same cluster. Use of other clustering algorithms (e.g., single linkage, average linkage) will often place samples that are not all closely related to each other into the same cluster. 1 However, when making inferences about the spread of an infectious pathogen, there are fewer negative consequences for failing to identify a close genetic association implicating the direction of spread of the pathogen than there are in falsely attributing spread where it did not occur. There is also some subjectivity in cluster analysis when identifying discrete clusters, which in the current analysis were inferred as identifying independent cycles of between-farm transmission. An alternative to cluster analysis using the same information on genetic similarities is multidimensional scaling, 39 which will create maps of genetic relationships among isolates. However, clusters of related viruses are less apparent, and therefore this method is less useful in reconstructing the course of an epidemic.
The decision rules and statistical methods used here for reconstructing the course of a viral epidemic have not been previously reported. Additional investigations are needed to improve this methodology. Nevertheless, the results of these analyses demonstrated that by using precise measures of genetic similarity in conjunction with epidemiologic information, the identification of sources and destinations in the transmission of an infectious pathogen can be based less on subjective judgment and more upon objective criteria. These improvements may substantially enhance the accuracy of epidemiologic investigations.
